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Abstract
This paper analyzes how institutions aimed at coordinating eco-
nomic interactions may emerge. Starting from a hypothetical state
of nature, agents can delegate the task of enforcing cooperation to
one of them in exchange for a proper compensation. Both individual
and collective commitment problems stand in the way of institution
formation. These problems imply first that a potentially efficient in-
stitution may fail to emerge and second that if it emerges, it may do so
inefficiently. We show that big and untrustworthy societies are more
likely to support institutions whereas their emergence is more difficult
in small and trusting societies, but if institutions do emerge they tend
to be more inefficient in the former type of societies. Finally, we show
that the threat of secession by a subset of agents may alleviate the
latter problem.
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“As for ‘philosophical history’, it involved accounting for the
development of beliefs, practices, theories, and institutions on
the basis of natural causes or principles, when actual records and
reports of witnesses were lacking.”
Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (1995).
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and overview
To date the literature on the economic analysis of social and political insti-
tutions have focused mainly on their role as protectors of property rights.1
A more neglected role of institutions is to correct the coordination failures
or commitment problems that sometimes plague the most basic type of eco-
nomic interactions.
The contributions along this line of enquiry have modeled institutions
as a set of self-enforcing constraints on behavior, usually relating them to
narrative descriptions derived from historical sources.2 In the words of Dixit
(2004), a distinction can be drawn depending on how the enforcement of
coordination or cooperation is attained: On the one hand, models of self-
governance, understood as equilibria sustained by some type of relation-based
multilateral mechanism (punishment, communication)3, and on the other
hand models of formal rule-based institutional arrangements, whereby some
qualified agent(s) takes on the role of solving coordination problems among
the rest of the population.4
All these works describe institutional arrangements already in place, but
very little has been said on the factors that lead to the emergence of these
institutions. The aim of this paper is precisely to model the process through
which they may or may not arise. In doing so, we focus specifically on
the class of rule-based coordination mechanisms, and analyze the delegation
process that gives rise to a specialized institution responsible for enforcing
some type of behavior by the agents that compose society. We do this in
1See Bardhan (2005).
2See Greif (1997).
3See Greif (1993), Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) inter alia. A more detailed liter-
ature review is carried out below.
4See Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) and Dixit (2003a) inter alia.
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the context of an “individualist” society, as Dixit (2003a) puts it, in which
interactions mostly involve strangers and cooperation cannot rely on the
type of multilateral mechanisms, norms and communication that prevail in
the context of more “collectivist” societies such as families, or small and
homogenous ethnic or religious groups.
Our point of departure is an economy in the state of nature in which the
value of each individual’s endowment is enhanced by bilaterally interacting
with others. Interactions take the form of a simple prisoners’ dilemma game.
Mutual cooperation would benefit both parties but being opportunistic is a
dominant strategy and in equilibrium very low payoffs are realized. Agents
would like to remedy this inefficiency by creating and institution capable of
enforcing the Pareto efficient outcome in any bilateral interaction.
The self-enforcing nature of institutions is modelled through a dynamic,
non-repeated game that agents play in this hypothetical state of nature. De-
pending on the existing incentives, players’ actions will eventually lead to the
establishment of such formal coordinating mechanism as an equilibrium of
the game. This body is akin to a judicial or political mechanism in charge of
the definition and enforcement of efficient rules for social interaction. More
precisely, it can be thought of as a reduced form of the institutional inter-
mediaries described in Milgrom et al. (1990) or Dixit (2003a). For the sake
of tractability, and because we want to focus on the potential emergence of
this body, we choose not to model explicitly its internal functioning.
For such formal institution to arise, agents need to delegate to one of
them the task of running it. The institution is costly to set up. The delegate
must relinquish her ability to interact with other agents, so must be properly
compensated in exchange. If the institution arises, agents have to decide
whether to become formal and abide by its norms of interaction or not.
Whenever two formal agents meet, the institution can guarantee that the
efficient outcome will result. However, in order to enjoy this benefit, agents
must pay a fee that constitutes the source of revenue for the institution.
We explore several procedures of institution formation and characterize
under which circumstances they will be successful. We make special emphasis
on the impact of these different processes on efficiency and welfare.
In a nutshell, individuals’ motivation to participate in the process of in-
stitution formation are the rents associated with the institutional task. This
together with the fact that they do not fully internalize the social benefit
generated by the institution, a decentralized process of institution formation
is plagued by two commitment problems. The first one is simply the indi-
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vidual commitment problem that arises when the revenue that can be raised
by the agent chosen to act as the institutional center is insufficient, and she
prefers to renege ex post, leading society to fall back into informality. The
second one, which we label “collective commitment” problem, is linked to
the fact that agents may not be able to write binding agreements on the fee
that will be charged by the center once it is designated.
Both limitations on commitment have implications for efficiency. The first
one implies that an institution may not arise due to the lack of individual
incentives despite being potentially welfare enhancing. This is in particular
the case when the extent of the coordination problem is limited. The intuition
is that when the level of trust in the state of nature is relatively high, the
outside option in which no institution emerges is more attractive and agents’
willingness to pay in order to create the institution is lower. On the other
hand, the lack of collective commitment implies that even if an institution
emerges, it may do so at a sub-optimal level of efficiency because the fee
finally charged may be too high from a social point of view. This happens for
low levels of trust in the state of nature, because in that case the institution
is able to set a high fee compared to the first-best level.
We show that small societies with high levels of trust are less likely to
support the emergence of institutions than big ones with low levels of trust,
but if institutions do emerge, they are more likely to be inefficient in the
latter type of societies.
Exogenously imposed commitment along each one of the two dimensions
alone would reduce the scope for inefficiencies, but the first-best institution
emerges only when both problems can be solved simultaneously. We then
examine several devices that may help to solve these commitment problems
endogenously. The first one is agents’ use of a particular typo of strategies
that enable them to constrain the center’s ability to extract too much re-
sources. The second potential improvement is the threat of secession by a
subset of agents. To deter blocking, the institution must charge a fee that
cannot be improved upon by any coalition. However, this effect only operates
for a limited parameter space; a big population size and high levels of trust
in the state of nature make it very attractive to become a central agent and
therefore create too strong incentives to secede.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Next, we review the related
literature. Section 2 presents the model and its basic elements. In Section 3
we characterize the equilibrium level of formality, given that the institution
has arisen, and the first best fee from the viewpoint of a social planner.
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Section 4 explores different procedures of institution formation characterized
by varying degrees of commitment. In Section 5 we explore two ways to
endogenize commitment. Section 6 offers a discussion of the results and
concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Literature review
Previous works on the role of institutions as coordination devices have mainly
explored two related lines of enquiry. First, they have analyzed the func-
tioning of specific institutional arrangements, in the light of both empirical
accounts and game-theoretical modelling. Examples are found in the eco-
nomic history literature with Greif’s (1993) study of the coalition supporting
the interactions of Maghribi traders with their distant agents in the 11th
century, Milgrom, North and Weingast’s (1990) analysis of merchant courts
at the Champagne fairs of the 12th and 13th centuries5; in the development
literature with for example the analysis of market institutions in Africa by
Fafchamps (2004) or in Asia by MacMillan and Woodruff (1999, 2000); and
in the law literature, with Bernstein’s (2001) account of the private legal
framework that rules the US cotton industry or the private arrangements in
the diamond industry analyzed by Bernstein (1992) and Richman (2006).
As discussed above, a useful distinction can be made between relation-
based type of mechanisms that rely on multilateral enforcement, such as the
ones described in Greif (1993) and modelled for example in Kandori (1992)
and Ellison (1994), and formal rule-based type of institutions characterized
by bilateral enforcement of interactions (Milgrom et al., 1990, Bernstein,
2001, and Richman, 2006 among others fall into that category). Relation-
based multilateral enforcement generally prevails in relatively homogenous
groups, while bilateral rule-based enforcement mechanisms are more likely in
the context of relatively anonymous interactions in large groups.6
Contributions opening the black box of institutions supporting rule-based
enforcement include the analysis of judges’ role in the Champaign fairs by
Milgrom et al. (1990), of Genoese traders in Greif (1997), or of a specialist in
violence in Bates and al. (2002). This shows that such institutions are poten-
tially very diverse and can rely not only on coercion, as in the “Hobbesian”
approach of Bates et al. (2002), but also on more subtle forms of persuasion,
5See Greif (1997) for a survey of the economic history literature that relies on micro-
economic theory to study institutions.
6Greif (1994). Dixit (2003b) and Li (2003) provide theoretical foundations.
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e.g. as a “Humean” political entrepreneur or government, able to persuade
others to take a particular action or alter their beliefs about this action’s
consequences (see Taylor, 1982, and Basu, 2000).
Further examples of contributions describing formal institutions of the
type we posit here can be found in various contexts. These include tribes
developing formal trade exchanges: Attali (2003) mentions examples of the
introduction of witnesses or legitimators certifying the validity of exchanges
in early societies of Africa, aboriginal Australia or precolombian Nicaragua
among others. Mafia and organized crime examples are also relevant, as for
example Gambetta’s (1993) account of the role of Peppe in ensuring that
cattle breeders and butchers do not cheat each other when transacting in an-
imals. The prominent role of the state in the East Asian development process
(see Aoki et al., 1997) or in the economic transition of Japan after WWII
(see Okazaki, 1997), demonstrates that formal institutions can be crucial in
economic development not only by protecting individual property rights, but
also by inducing and enforcing coordination when private mechanisms to do
so are absent or underdeveloped.
Second, a few economic contributions have analyzed how informal or per-
sonalized relationship-based institutions may coexist with more formal, rule-
based anonymous mechanisms, and how the transition from one to the other
may occur (e.g. Kranton, 1996, and Dixit, 2004). This has also been an
important topic in social anthropology. For example, Ensminger (1992) de-
scribes the century-long process through which changes in the environment
finally triggered the Orma tribe in Kenya to move from a rule by a council of
elders to the recognition of the authority of the modern Kenyan nation-state.
To some extent, our paper formalizes some of the claims made informally
by Greif (2005) who, based on historical examples, concludes that societies
with strong informal institutions will have a low demand for formal enforce-
ment methods. The author also shows how rulers’ ability to abuse rights
hinder the creation of institutions. In our case, the ruler’s ability to extract
the whole surplus has an impact on efficiency rather than on emergence, lead-
ing to a situation in which institutions may still emerge in low trust societies
but they are more likely to be inefficient. Furthermore, this extracting ability
is the key reason why some agent will be willing to perform the institutional
task, although it may not always be sufficient.
Finally, our research is also related to contributions concerned with the
emergence of the State. The concept of the State as an entity solving co-
ordination problems is a long-standing one, as exemplified by Taylor (1982)
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or Basu (2000). Bates, Greif and Singh (2002) provide numerous historical
examples to support their theoretical account of why agents may seek to at-
tribute the monopoly of violence to a delegate, a canonical State, in charge
of ensuring peace and enabling higher levels of production. Our model en-
dogenizes the rise of a ruler from a population of identical individuals, in
contrast with other works in the literature that exogenously impose its exis-
tence (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2004) and look at how its presence
shapes economic outcomes or compare the scenarios with and without ruler
(Grossman, 2002; Moselle and Polak, 2001). However, rather than drawing
conclusions for specific types of interactions or environments, our analysis
aims at uncovering general principles that can help us understand the process
of institutional creation in different economic and social contexts.
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by N + 1 agents, who have an initial en-
dowment ω (representing a combination of skills, time and goods). Agents’
interactions in this economy are described by the basic game G in Figure 1.
0,0z,-zNC
-z,zx,xC
NCC
Player j
Player i
Figure 1: Basic game G.
Agents are anonymous to each other. They are randomly and bilaterally
matched to play G. Payoffs in the matrix represent the return per unit of
endowment invested in the interaction. We assume that z > x > 0. The
strategy C stands for a cooperative behavior that can create added value,
and NC stands for an opportunistic behavior that allows the agent to take
advantage of a cooperating partner but yields zero returns otherwise.
The game G admits a unique Nash equilibrium, (NC,NC), that is Pareto
inferior to (C,C). As is common in the literature, we have chosen this game as
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the simplest way to illustrate the type of coordination problems that occur in
many social situations, but many other games could capture the same trade-
offs we study here, like for instance a coordination game with two equilibria,
one Pareto-superior to the other.
The scenario in which individuals are randomly and bilaterally matched
and play G without any interference is assumed to be the status-quo of the
economy. In order to solve the problem of opportunism, agents can set up
an institution with the power to enforce cooperation and ensure that the
efficient outcome (C,C) results from any interaction between agents under
its oversight. Given that we are mainly interested in studying when such
institutions can arise, and that in doing so we want to keep the analysis
tractable, in what follows we just consider a reduced form of the actual
process the institution employs to enforce cooperation.
This institution arises when agents delegate to one of them, who we will
call the center, the task of running it. The central agent relinquishes her
ability to interact with other agents, so she must be compensated in ex-
change. At this point, we deliberatively remain vague about how this dele-
gation process is carried through since the main body of the paper (Section
4 below) amounts to discussing several procedures of institution formation.
If the institution arises, agents have to decide whether to abide by it, that
is to become formal, or not to do so and remain informal. However, in order
to become formal and interact under the institutional umbrella, they have to
pay a fixed fee a ≤ ω, that can be understood as an entry fee or a lump-sum
tax that rewards the center for her activity. Below we will also discuss at
length how the level of the fee a is fixed.
We will admit a richer description of the payoff x in G and assume that
it depends on the efficiency of the institutional mechanism that in turn is a
function of the level of agents’ contribution a.7 Hence, the per-person unit
return from an interaction between two formal agents is
vF = x (a) , (1)
where the superscript F denotes “Formal” and x(·) satisfies xa > 0, xaa < 0,
and the standard Inada condition, lima→0 xa (a) =∞. We thus assume that
7Making x also dependent on N would introduce scale effects. Alternatively, x could
also be a function of the proportion of agents KN contributing to it. However, it is unclear
how this would affect x. Indeed, a higher proportion could have a positive effect because
of network externalities for example, but congestion could also lead to a negative effect
(see Kranton, 1996).
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the institution becomes more efficient when endowed with more resources,
as it is able to monitor better its members’ behavior or to invest more in
physical or relational supporting infrastructure, as for example in the case of
diamond clubs described in Richman (2006). If x did not depend on a, so
for instance it took two values depending on whether the institution arises
or not, all our results on emergence would hold, but we would be unable to
distinguish levels of efficiency.
When at least one of the two interacting agents is informal, the institution
has no power to enforce the efficient outcome and the game G is played
without any further interference. Informal agents thus avoid paying the fee
but their interactions yield lower returns. They will sometimes result in
(NC,NC) being played. Still, in this state of nature, agents may occasionally
cooperate with each other despite the absence of material incentives to do so
or of any formal institution enforcing coordination.8 Otherwise, any of the
other two possible outcomes (C,NC) and (NC,C) might also be played.
As a result, the per-person expected unit return when G is played between
a formal and an informal agent or between two informal agents is
vI = τx (a) , (2)
where the superscript I denotes “Informal”. We refer to the parameter τ < 1,
which captures the expected return from interactions in a world without in-
stitution, as the level of trust or cooperation in the society under the state
of nature. An alternative interpretation of the parameter τ , in line with the
literature on informality, is the level of free-riding that informal interactions
can make on formal institutions.9 To keep the model tractable, this is as-
sumed to be an initial condition of our economy that depends upon culture,
expectations and the specific type of interactions considered.10 Note that a
8There is substantial experimental evidence showing that subjects are willing to coop-
erate and trust others in prisoners’ dilemma-like settings much more often than what the
theory predicts (see for instance Marwell and Ames (1981) or Dawes and Thaler (1988)
among many others) and that some players are unconditional cooperators/defectors (An-
dreoni and Samuelson, 2006). This likelihood of cooperation is also often referred to as a
measure of “social capital” in theoretical contributions based on the prisoners’ dilemma
(Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). We return to this
interpretation in the final discussion.
9See for example Marcouiller and Young (1995), Choi and Thum (2002), Azuma and
Grossman (2002) and Straub (2005).
10As mentioned in the final discussion, it is intuitive for example that τ might be in-
versely related to N .
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full characterization of τ could be derived as the equilibrium outcome in a
framework in which agents have varying degree of trustworthiness, for ex-
ample if a fraction of them are unconditional cooperators/defectors, while
others are conditional cooperators (see Dixit, 2003a).
Finally, we assume that x(0) > 1τ to ensure that participating in a com-
pletely informal economy always dominates the autarchic situation in which
agents do not interact and simply consume their endowments.
Under risk neutrality and anonymous random matching11, the expected
payoff of a formal agent when K ≥ 2 agents are formal is then:
V F =
K − 1
N − 1 (ω − a) v
F +
N −K
N − 1 (ω − a) v
I
=
K − 1
N − 1 (ω − a)x (a) +
N −K
N − 1 (ω − a) τx (a) . (3)
We assume that an institution becomes active if at least two agents are
formal, so the probability of formal exchanges is strictly positive. On the
other hand, the payoff for an informal agent is just.
V I = ωvI = ωτx (a) ,
since he avoids paying the formality fee. Note that when no more than one
agent becomes formal, vFa = v
I
a = τx (0) for any a that the central agent
might have set.
Finally, the central agent, who gives up interacting with the rest of agents,
receives the fees paid by all formal agents. Hence, her payoff is given by
V C = K(a− c),
where c is the fixed enforcement cost per formal agent, linked for example to
the need to record information on its behavior, maintain proper infrastruc-
ture, etc. As will come clear below, an alternative formulation with a cost
proportional to the number of formal transactions would not qualitatively
change results.
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the game described above.
11We discuss alternative matching technologies in the final section of the paper.
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t=1
A delegation 
process occurs 
that determines 
who will run the 
institution.
t=2
If the institution has 
emerged, the fee a
to be paid by formal 
agents is set. If not, 
the status quo 
remains (informal 
exchanges)
t=3
Agents decide 
whether to 
become formal 
(pay the fee) or 
not.
t=4
Agents are 
randomly 
matched and 
play G. Payoffs 
are realized.
time
Figure 2: Timing of the game.
We have thus constructed a dynamic, non-repeated game of complete
information in four stages. In the first stage, agents set up the institution (the
game stops there if they do not succeed in doing so). Then, the institutional
fee a is set. In the third stage, agents decide whether to become formal
or not. In the last stage, they are paired with another interacting agent in
society and play G, eventually resorting to the institution set up earlier.
3 The equilibrium level of formality
3.1 Existence and Stability
Given this basic framework, the first question that arises concerns the ex-
istence and stability of different configurations. Assume that K agents are
formal, N −K are informal, and that, without loss of generality, the N +1th
agent is devoted to institutional work. Given a fee a, this division of agents
between formality and informality can be supported in equilibrium if and
only if no agent is willing to deviate and change her status.
A formal agent’s best response is not to deviate and become informal as
long as V FK,a ≥ V IK−1,a. After some transformations, this can be written:
a ≤ ω
µ
1− (N − 1) τ
K − 1 + (N −K)τ
¶
≡ a(K).
Similarly, an informal agent will not choose formality as long as V IK,a ≥
V FK+1,a, which yields:
a ≥ ω
µ
1− (N − 1) τ
K + (N −K − 1)τ
¶
= a(K + 1).
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Note first that 0 < a(K) < ω for allK > 1 and that given our assumption
above stating that the institution remains inactive if K = 1, a(1) = 0.
The equilibrium level of formality will depend upon the properties of a(·).
The next Proposition characterizes the conditions under which there exists
a level of the institutional fee a that can support a certain amount of formal
agents in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The function a(·) is strictly increasing in K. Hence, there
are only two equilibria, one with K = 0 and one with K = N .
In this setting, only corner equilibria can arise, i.e. full formality or full
informality. This result might change if the payoff of the informal agents did
not depend on the efficiency of the institution, but only if xa is large enough.
When full formality prevails, a(N) = ω (1− τ). We will assume that
c < ω (1− τ) . Otherwise even the highest fee compatible with full formality
could not cover the running costs of the institution. The following proposition
characterizes a necessary condition for this outcome to arise in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A necessary condition for informality (K = 0) to be an equi-
librium is a ≥ 0, whereas a necessary condition for full formality (K = N)
to be an equilibrium is a ≤ a(N).
The proof follows from the arguments above. This Proposition shows
that a coordination problem arises when the institution emerges. Paying a
fee compatible with full formality may not compensate the cost of becom-
ing formal when everybody else is informal. Hence, both full formality and
informality can be sustained in equilibria for the same level of the fee. For
the rest of the paper, we will mainly focus on the equilibrium in which the
institution forms. We see it as more natural because at that point of the
game agents have decided to participate in the process, a central agent has
been chosen and the fee has already been announced. Still, we will leave a
further discussion on the informal equilibrium to Section 5.
Figure 3 depicts the profile of equilibria as a function of the fee a.12
12For the range of fees [0, a(N)] there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
agents become formal with probability p(a) = τ1−τ
a
ω−a . Although this can in principle
support an intermediate level of formality, the revenue raised by the institution in this
equilibrium is maximized at a = a(N) so p(a(N)) = 1. Hence, in this case full formality
would arise as well.
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0 a(N)
Only informalityMultiple equilibria: full 
formality or  informality
Formality equilibrium
Informality equilibrium
Figure 3: Profile of equilibria
3.2 The first best institutional fee
In the remainder of this Section, we characterize the optimum fee from the
viewpoint of a hypothetical central planner willing to maximize the total sum
of agents’ utilities. The planner compares the maximum welfare attainable
in the scenario in which agents pay a fee to enjoy the benefits of formal
interactions with the (fixed) level of social welfare under complete informality.
In the case of full formality, the constrained maximization problem of this
planner can be written as:
max
a
WF (a(N)) = N [(ω − a)x(a) + (a− c)] + ω
s.t. a ≤ a(N).
Given our assumptions on x(·), this objective function is concave. The
intuition behind this is that increasing a makes the institution more efficient
but it also reduces the endowment available for interactions. The first order
condition implicitly characterizes an interior solution a∗ such that:
ω − a∗ = x(a
∗)− 1
xa(a∗)
. (4)
The fee a∗ cannot be higher than the maximum fee compatible with full
formality. Hence, the planner chooses to implement full formality with a fee
equal to
aF = min{a∗, a(N)}.
This implies that the solution to the planner’s problem will be a corner
solution, i.e. a∗ ≥ a(N), as long as τ ≥ τ ∗, where τ ∗ satisfies:13
τ ∗ =
x(ω(1− τ ∗))− 1
ωxa(ω(1− τ ∗))
. (5)
13It is straightforward to show that such fixed point exists.
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As τ increases, formal agents have stronger incentives to defect. A lower
fee a(N) is now necessary to support formality and the room for an interior
solution shrinks. On the other hand, the effect of an increase in the endow-
ment ω is ambiguous: It relaxes the constraint but also changes the objective
function by making interactions more profitable.
The planner can leave the economy in a state of full informality. In that
case, total welfare is just
W I = (N + 1)ωτx(0). (6)
There may exist values of the parameters for which the maximum welfare
under formality, i.e. WF (a(N))(aF ), is lower than under informality. This is
characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Social welfare under full formality is lower than under in-
formality if
x(0) >
1
N + 1
(
1
τ
+N
¡
ω − aF
¢
x(aF ) + aF − c
τω
) ≡ x(N,ω, τ). (7)
Moreover, x(N,ω, τ) is increasing in both the population size N and agents’
initial endowment ω and decreasing in the status-quo level of trust τ .
Hence, for small and relatively poor economies (low N or ω) full formality
may not be the most desirable outcome. Similarly, when the problems of
miscoordination are not very severe (high τ), the cost of setting an institution
may outweigh the gains.
4 Emergence of the institution
Since no central coordination device exists before the members of a society
actually create one, any effort to set up an institution that will enforce co-
operation has to proceed in a decentralized way. The basic idea is that the
center must be given incentives to act as such. In this Section, we analyze
this process and highlight how commitment problems affect the efficiency of
the emerging institution or block its emergence despite its potentially welfare
enhancing effect.
We define a procedure of institution formation as a fair lottery over the
set of agents who freely participate in it. This lottery designates the agent
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who subsequently will be in charge of running the institution. The fee a can
be set either before the lottery takes place or afterwards.
A lottery is the simplest mechanism to choose the individual to be in
charge of the institution. It is so because all agents are alike and hence there
is no reason why a priori they should not be equally likely to end up in
charge of the institution. This is reminiscent of Rawls’ (1971) concept of
the original position. Moreover, a lottery also constitutes the reduced form
of more complex mechanisms, like for instance auctions or contests: If they
were used, the equilibrium would be typically symmetric and a winner should
therefore be randomly chosen.
In this general framework, different procedures of institution formation
are possible depending on the different degrees of commitment available both
at the individual and at the collective level, the natural benchmark being a
fully decentralized process with no commitment whatsoever.
Agents must decide simultaneously and ex-ante whether to participate or
not in the lottery that will designate who will run the institution. Hence,
given a level of the fee a, the institution can arise only if
1
N + 1
(N(a− c) + ω) + N
N + 1
(ω − a)x(a) ≥ ωτx(a), (8)
where the left hand side shows the expected payoff from participating, as
the sum of the center’s and the agents’ payoffs respectively weighted by
their corresponding probabilities, and the right hand side is the payoff from
unilateral deviation. In equilibrium, it is easy to show that either all or no
agent will participate in the process.
All the different processes of institution formation that we will discuss
next rely on this basic participation constraint. Still, agents who accept
to participate in the process may change their mind ex-post depending on
the outcome of the lottery. Therefore, when there is no commitment at the
individual level, an ex-post participation constraint needs to be imposed as
well. This requires that, once they discover their role, agents should not
prefer to fall back into informality. As this ex-post requirement is always
satisfied for an agent who does not become the center14, the center’s ex-post
participation constraint is the only relevant one:
N(a− c) + ω ≥ ωτx(0). (9)
14It is obvious that (ω − a)x(a) ≥ ωτx(a) for any a not greater than the upper bound
on a, which is a(N) = ω(1− τ).
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This defines a minimum level of the fee
a ≡ ωτx(0)− 1
N
+ c,
below which the agent chosen to be the center would prefer to give up and
the whole economy would collapse into informality.15
The benchmark assumption of no commitment implies that collective
choices are not possible and that the central agent has total freedom to set
the fee once she takes up her role. In that case, she will behave as a revenue
maximizing monopolist. However, we will also contemplate the possibility of
the fee a being chosen collectively and that this choice may be binding. In
this case, agents will set a fee that maximizes total welfare behind the veil
of ignorance, that is, before the outcome of the lottery is realized.16 Table 1
below summarizes the possible combinations of assumptions.
   
Lottery choice 
is binding 
   
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Center can 
commit to a 
fee a 
 
 
No 
1. Agents’ only 
commit to participate 
in the lottery ex ante. 
The center may 
renege ex post and is 
free to set a. 
2. Agents commit ex 
ante to participate in 
the lottery and cannot 
renege ex post if 
chosen as the center. 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
3. Agents commit ex 
ante to participate in 
the lottery. If chosen 
as the center, they 
may renege, but have 
no freedom to set a.  
4. Agents commit ex 
ante to participate in 
the lottery and not to 
renege ex post. The 
center has no freedom 
to set a ex post. 
Table 1.
Next we explore these different scenarios, starting with the natural bench-
mark, the “no commitment” case.
15Note that because all agents are alike and either all or none participate in the lottery
ex ante, we do not have to worry about the case of an agent not participating in the lottery
but willing to become formal ex post.
16Admittedly there may be other processes. The ones considered here are polar cases.
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4.1 No Commitment
Under the “no commitment” or fully decentralized procedure, the fee is freely
set by the central agent. Hence, in addition to the ex-ante participation
constraint, the ex-post one must be imposed. We know from Section 3 that
the maximum fee that the institution can charge is a(N). Therefore, agents
will participate only if the two following conditions hold:
1
N + 1
(N(a(N)− c) + ω) + N
N + 1
(ω − a(N))x(a(N)) ≥ ωτx(a(N)), (10)
N(a(N)− c) + ω ≥ ωτx(0), (11)
which are simply the result of rewriting the ex ante lottery participation
constraint (8) and the ex post constraint of the center (9) by replacing a
with a(N). These two conditions are necessary for the institution to arise.
Note that when a = a(N), trading agents are indifferent between formality
and informality. Therefore, (10) can be rewritten as:
N(a(N)− c) + ω ≥ ωτx(a(N)), (12)
from which it is evident that (10) is a necessary and sufficient condition for
(11) to be satisfied. If it does not hold, the economy will remain in a state
of informality.17
Finally, we need to establish which fee will be set by the institution in
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 If condition (12) holds, there exists a SPE of the fully de-
centralized procedure of institution formation that implements full formality
under the fee a(N).
There are two possible sources of inefficiency in this scenario. On the one
hand, full formality is not implemented when (12) does not hold, despite the
fact that it may still be efficiency enhancing. This is the case when para-
meters are such that the level of individual welfare (assuming equal weights)
obtained under formality
WF (a(N))(a(N)) =
1
N + 1
(N(a(N)− c) + ω) + N
N + 1
(ω − a(N))x(a(N)),
17Of course, this is only true for a = a(N) and needs not be verified for lower values of
the fee.
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dominates the level of welfare under full informality but is not high enough
to induce ex ante participation in the lottery.
Corollary 1 (Non-emergence of efficient institutions) Under the fully
decentralized procedure, a potentially welfare enhancing institution does not
arise if and only if
ωτx(0) ≤WF (a(N))(a(N)) ≤ ωτx(a(N)). (13)
Such inefficiency occurs in economies of intermediate size and when the
status-quo level of trust τ is sufficiently high.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The lower bound in (13) deter-
mines when formality is more efficient than informality, whereas the upper
bound establishes when formality is implementable. Between these bounds,
the institution is welfare enhancing but it does not emerge.
In line with Dixit (2004) and Greif (2006), Corollary 1 shows that the
first type of inefficiency is more likely to occur in economies of intermediate
size and with limited coordination problems (high τ). In the first place, it
occurs if the size of the population is not small enough for informality to be
superior, but not big enough for the institution to arise. The reason why
N has to be large enough for the institution to arise comes from the fact
that the center’s expected revenue is increasing in N , so there is a minimum
population size above which the prospect of becoming the center gives agents
enough incentive to participate in the lottery. As in Bates et al. (2002), the
agent endowed with the institutional role reneges if she is not able to extract
enough resources.
On the other hand, the range of parameters for which a welfare enhanc-
ing institution does not arise expands as τ increases. High status-quo trust
makes the outside option of informality more attractive and undermines the
dominant position of the revenue-maximizing institution. We should then
observe the emergence of formal institutions in societies plagued with coor-
dination problems and low levels of informal trust, while informal exchanges
are more likely to prevail in societies with relatively high level of trust. The
fact that inefficiencies are less costly to agents implies that bearing the cost
involved in solving them is not incentive compatible at the individual level,
despite being socially efficient. In conclusion, even if the central agent is able
to maximize revenue when setting a, the emergence of a desirable institution
is not ensured.
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This corollary would need some qualification if we relaxed two assump-
tions of our framework. First, if the central agent does not specialize com-
pletely in the institutional task and retains some ability to interact, her
incentives to act as such would increase, hence reducing the range of inef-
ficiency. Still, as long as she cannot enjoy the full benefit from interacting
with others, inefficiency will persist. On the other hand, if the payoff of infor-
mal agents does not depend on the efficiency of the institution, inefficiency
vanishes. But as soon as we have some degree of free-riding the result holds
again.
Even if full formality is implemented, the fee set by the central agent may
be too high and the first best may not be attained. A necessary condition
for this second type of inefficiency to occur is a low enough degree of trust
in bilateral interactions, i.e. τ < τ ∗, that implies aF = a∗ < a(N).
Corollary 2 (Implementable first best) When condition (12) holds, the
first best fee aF can be implemented in a SPE of the fully decentralized pro-
cedure of institution formation for high enough levels of status quo-trust, i.e.
τ ≥ τ ∗.
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp. When welfare is increasing
over the range of fees compatible with formality or, in other words, when the
level of status-quo trust τ is sufficiently high, the planner would like to set
the highest fee possible (i.e., aF = a(N)). In that case, the center’s incentives
are aligned with social welfare and the first best can be attained by means of
the decentralized procedure. Otherwise, the emergent institution will tend
to be inefficient.
In conjunction, these two corollaries imply that different societies are
characterized by different inefficiencies. Institutions are more likely to emerge
in societies with low levels of trust, but if they do, they will tend to be too
extractive relative to the socially optimal outcome. On the other hand, more
trustworthy societies may find it difficult to generate formal coordinating
institutions, but if they succeed, these are more likely to be efficient.
4.2 Partial Commitment
While the no commitment case appears to be the natural benchmark of
our economy, it is useful to consider how the outcome of the procedure of
institution formation varies when some degree of commitment is introduced
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along each of the two dimensions considered above: Individual commitment
and a binding collective choice of the fee.
Of course, this raises the question of how such a commitment is secured
and enforced. We have some sort of a chicken-and-egg problem here: We
started in an institutionless world, where there was a basic problem of en-
forcing coordination in bilateral relations. The possibility of commitment in
the present case would however indicate the existence of perhaps a mecha-
nism capable of enforcing it. After showing briefly how commitment may
improve efficiency in the institution formation process under each of the pos-
sible combinations of assumptions considered in Table 1 above, we discuss
how it may be enforced: In Section 5, we analyze in more detail two mecha-
nisms that may endogenously support some degree of collective commitment
despite full decentralization.
As mentioned, introducing commitment at the individual level amounts
to assume that agents do not renege ex post, whatever the outcome of the
lottery. Therefore, only agents’ ex-ante participation constraint (8) needs to
be satisfied (Case 2). On the other hand, at the collective level, commitment
arises if the fee a is fixed by all participating agents before the actual running
of the lottery and this choice is binding (Case 3). Finally, combining the two
yields the possibility of full commitment (Case 4).
Case 2. First, assume that agents are able to commit to set up the in-
stitution if chosen to run it, so the ex-post participation constraint (11) is
dropped, but the center retains total freedom to set the fee. Therefore, only
condition (10) must hold. Since we know from Case 1 that condition (10) is
stronger than (11), it is obvious that this does not introduce any change with
respect to the benchmark no-commitment case. This shows that a stronger
individual commitment is only useful if accompanied by some degree of col-
lective commitment on the choice of the fee (see Case 4 below).
Case 3. Consider now the case in which a binding choice of the fee a is
made by agents in advance to the lottery, but they cannot commit ex-ante
not to renege ex-post in case they are chosen to run the institution. Then,
society will choose a fee that maximizes social welfare subject to the ex post
participation constraint, that is, a fee high enough to compensate the central
agent. Hence it must be at least greater than a. Still, the fee chosen has to
be compatible with full formality (hence not above a(N)). Once this holds,
society will implement a fee as close as possible to the first best.
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Proposition 5 The collective choice of the fee implements full formality if
and only if a ≤ a(N). In that case, the fee set is a = max{a, aF} and the
first best is achieved if and only if a ≤ aF .
First, it is important to note that the collective choice of the fee makes the
implementation of the institution no easier than under the fully decentralized
procedure, as it still requires a ≤ a(N). However, this type of commitment
makes the institution more efficient when implemented, because the first best
is now more likely to be attained. On the other hand, even if that cannot be
the case, i.e. a(N) > a ≥ a∗, there is an improvement with respect to the
same case under the fully decentralized procedure, since the fee chosen is a
instead of a(N), and thus closer to the social optimum.
Case 4. Finally, consider the case where there is no ex-post participation
constraint (strong individual commitment) and agents agree that they should
implement the first best.18 It is easy to see that then the efficient outcome
is always implemented.
Proposition 6 When both individual and collective commitment are possi-
ble, full formality is implemented if and only if informality does not maximize
welfare, i.e. x(0) ≤ x(N,ω, τ). Moreover, the first-best is always attained.
The intuition is straightforward: When x(0) ≤ x(N,ω, τ), the first best
fee aF is high enough to ensure that the ex-ante participation constraint
(8) is satisfied. Therefore, individual incentives do not stand in the way of
efficiency in this case and formality is implemented whenever it is efficient.
To summarize, when considering the decentralized institution formation
process, the inability to constrain the center to chose a specific level of fee
(lack of collective commitment) is a strong reason for the occurrence of ineffi-
ciencies, and one that cannot be alleviated by introducing individual commit-
ment (Case 2). As this limit is relaxed, potential inefficiencies are reduced,
as shown by Case 3. Finally, when the ability to set fees ex-ante is combined
with individual commitment (Case 4), the first best is always implementable.
The next Section discusses two decentralized mechanisms through which
some degree of commitment may be enforced.
18While in the no commitment case discussed in the previous section the ex-post partic-
ipation constraint was irrelevant as it was implied by the ex ante one, this may of course
not be the case when a < a(N).
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5 Endogenous commitment
We have just showed that ex-ante collective commitment tends to increase
the likelihood of the institution arising and hence efficiency. The next step is
to endogenize it. In this Section we consider two mechanisms to achieve this:
We first explore the use of threshold strategies in the benchmark version of
our game. Then we study the possibility of coalitional secession.
5.1 Threshold strategies
In the discussion above, we left aside the full informality equilibrium. Recall
from Proposition 2 that full informality can arise in equilibrium of any fee in
the interval [0, a(N)]. Agents can use this multiplicity of equilibria to tame
the central agent and make him reduce the fee. To show this consider the
following threshold strategy to be used by agents in our one-shot game:
F =
½
1 if a ≤ a0
0 otherwise,
(14)
where a0 ≤ a(N). These strategies constitute an equilibrium of the subgame
that starts after the central agents announces the fee. Then, if all agents use
them to decide whether to become formal or not, the central agent’s best
response under no commitment is to choose a0. This threat enlarges the set
of possible fees that can be supported in equilibrium and opens the door to a
welfare improvement. Still, the ex-post constraint must be satisfied, so this
profile can only implement fees greater than a.
Proposition 7 If condition (8) holds for a∗ ≥ a, there exists a SPE of the
fully decentralized procedure that implements the first-best fee.
Notice that the use of this type of strategies leads to a scenario very
similar to the one in Case 3, because they act as some sort of collective
commitment device to choose and enforce a given level of the fee, i.e. the
threshold a0,that may be closer to the first-best fee. For that threshold to
be implemented it must be be compatible with the center acting as such, i.e.
a0 ≥ a, and it must ensure that agents want to participate in the process,
i.e. it must satisfy condition (8). Moreover, even if the first best cannot be
attained (because a(N) > a ≥ a∗), threshold strategies can help to reduce
the inefficiency associated with a too extractive central agent.
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However, it is not clear how in a state of nature that we define as com-
pletely noncooperative, agents can coordinate in the use of these strategies,
which seem to involve some degree of multilateral agreement.
5.2 Secession
Let us now consider the possibility that a coalition of agents secedes from
society to run their own institution.
Since our starting point is a state of nature where no commitment is
possible, the concept of secession-proofness has a clear importance. An insti-
tution can hardly be called self-enforcing if a subgroup of agents can improve
its situation by withdrawing from it.
Specifically, our analysis of secession will concentrate on the secession-
proofness of the decentralized procedure of institution formation, assuming
that it will be employed both by the whole population and any subgroup
intending to withdraw. Then, we analyze when the threat of secession can
prevent the emergence of a single institution and its effect on efficiency.
Let us first state our definition of blocking:
Definition 1 Denote by aN the fee set by the institution. A coalition formed
by S interacting agents is a blocking coalition if and only if
(ω − aN)x(aN) <
1
S
(S(a(N)− c) + ω) + S − 1
S
(ω − a(N))x(a(N)). (15)
Our concept of blocking implies that no group of agents should prefer
(in expectation) to withdraw from society and apply among them the fully
decentralized procedure of institution formation. This is a relatively strong
requirement.19 Note that when a coalition contemplates the possibility of
secession, it recognizes that the fee that will be set in the hypothetical new
institution must be itself self-enforcing. We have in this case picked a(N),
the equilibrium fee we have at length considered in the previous sections.20
19Alternatively, we could have imposed a weaker criterion, as in Howe and Roemer
(1981), in which a coalition is blocking whenever it can guarantee a higher payoff to its
members
20Note that for all S, a(N) = a(S) = ω(1− τ), so we stick to the current notation for
simplicity.
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Definition 2 A fee aN is said to be secession-proof if it does not spawn any
blocking coalition.
Secession-proof fees are natural focal points in the process of institution
formation: They are said to be in the core of that particular procedure of
institution formation.21
Given that we are analyzing the case of no commitment, we assume that
the central agent will set the maximum possible secession-proof fee. Secession
thus imposes new and natural constraints on the fee that the institutional
agent can charge. Notice that, if full formality is not implementable when
secession is not an option, this will continue to be the case when secession
is possible; since the revenue of the central agent cannot increase, secession
thus cannot help potentially welfare enhancing institutions to emerge.
The first question that arises is whether the set of secession-proof fees is
empty or not. It is easy to check that the payoff of a coalition contemplating
the possibility of withdrawing is increasing in its size S. Therefore, for a fee
to be secession-proof it is enough to satisfy condition (15) for S = N.
On the other hand, the fee that maximizes agents’ welfare solves
max
a
N (ω − a)x(a)
s.t. a ≤ a(N).
The above program yields an interior solution a∗∗ characterized by the
first order condition
ω − a∗∗ = x(a
∗∗)
xa(a∗∗)
. (16)
Therefore it is clear that a∗∗ < a∗. Again, there exist a threshold τ ∗∗ such that
the solution to this problem is interior whenever τ ≥ τ ∗∗. It is straightforward
as well to show that τ ∗ < τ ∗∗. Hence, the level of the fee that maximizes the
welfare of the set of interacting agents is either a∗∗ or a(N). Let us assume,
for the sake of exposition, that min{a∗∗, a(N)} > a.
The set of secession-proof fees is thus non-empty if and only if
1
N
((N − 1)(a(N)− c) + ω) + N − 1
N
τωx(a(N)) (17)
≤ (ω −min{a∗∗, a(N)})x(min{a∗∗, a(N)}).
21As any core-related concept, our definition of blocking only takes into account one-
step secessions. We do not consider the possibility of further blocking once a new society
is formed. The set of secession-proof fees defined here is thus minimal in this sense.
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If this condition is not met, we should expect the emergence of multiple
institutions. The next proposition summarizes the conditions, in terms of the
population size N and the level of status-quo trust τ , under which secession
may occur.
Proposition 8 The set of secession-proof fees is non-empty if and only if
N is below a certain threshold eN(τ ,ω). Furthermore, eN(τ ,ω) attains a min-
imum at τ = τ ∗(< τ ∗∗).
The main reason for blocking in this model is thus the prospect of be-
coming the center in the new mini society. When the size of the population
is sufficiently big, the center obtains an extremely high payoff and this cre-
ates strong incentives to withdraw. As a matter of fact a(N) stops being
secession-proof when condition
(N − 1)(a(N)− c) + ω > τωx(a(N)),
holds, implying that the central agent of the new institution can obtain a
higher payoff than the rest of agents.
Figure 4 depicts the regions characterized by these thresholds in the pa-
rameter space.
N
aa* a**
SP = Ø
a1(N) is SP
SP?Ø
Figure 4: The set of secession-proof fees.
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When the level of status-quo trust is sufficiently small (i.e. τ < τ ∗∗) and
the population size is intermediate, it may still be possible for the institution
to avoid secession by charging a fee below a(N). In that case, secession can
help to alleviate the inefficiency produced by a too high fee compared to
the case where secession is not possible. But outside this region of parame-
ters, secession is a real threat that renders impossible the emergence of one
institution comprising all agents in society.
The natural question that now arises is whether the impossibility of a sin-
gle institution matters from an efficiency perspective. The answer of course
depends on the particular rules of secession and coalition formation to be
considered. Here we will assume that whatever this process is, any division
of the population into several smaller societies is stable only if all groups can
set a secession-proof fee.
Formally, a coalition structure is a division of the population into a col-
lection C = {C1, ..., CK} of disjoint coalitions of generic size Sk ≥ 3. It is
straightforward to extend our previous definition of secession-proof fees to
the case of subgroups: We will say that a coalition structure C is secession-
proof if all coalitions in it set a (possibly different) fee that does not spawn
a blocking coalition within them. Here, we will concentrate on the case of
τ ≥ τ ∗∗ for simplicity, meaning that in any secession-proof coalition structure
all groups will set a(N) since it is the unique secession-proof fee.
Next we show that if one considers secession-proof coalition structures as
the natural outcome of any process of coalition formation (or secession), the
impossibility of a single institution is negative from a social point of view.
Proposition 9 When τ ≥ τ ∗∗,the total sum of payoffs under the single in-
stitution is at least as big as under any secession-proof coalition structure.
As mentioned before, the incentives to secede come from agents’ prospect
of becoming the center of the new mini-society. Recall that when the fee is
a(N), it is only the central agent who extracts positive rents. However, this
is socially wasteful because it leads to an unnecessary proliferation of insti-
tutions. Obviously, this conclusion makes abstraction from the possibility
that the coordination job of the center in smaller groups may entail lower
transaction costs, i.e. lower c in our model. If that is the case, a trade-off
arises and the above conclusion may require qualification.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to focus on the process through which
institutions aimed at enforcing cooperation may actually emerge in a context
in which no coordination device previously exists. More specifically, our aim
is to determine whether this mechanism arises whenever it is potentially
welfare enhancing, and when it does, whether it is as efficient as it could
possibly be.
We have built a model in which economic interactions take the form of a
modified prisoner’s dilemma game. In a hypothetical state of nature, agents
from a population are randomly matched to play this game without any
further interference and hence some degree of inefficiency ensues. We have
assumed that agents can delegate the task of enforcing cooperation to one of
them (the institution) in exchange for a proper compensation. Examples of
this type of mechanisms can be found in Economics, Sociology and Law..
In a world of no commitment, the main motivation to participate in the
process of institution formation is the potential rent associated with being a
revenue maximizing center. In this context, the model yields clear answers
to both questions above. First, there exists a region in the parameters space
in which a potentially welfare enhancing institution does not arise. This is
because individual and social incentives are not aligned and each individual
fails to internalize the cost that he imposes on others by opting out of the
potential institutional arrangement. Such an inefficiency is more likely for
societies of intermediate size. Groups that are too small are optimally left
to the informal type of interaction. Although this is not made explicit in
our model, an additional intuitive reason for this may be that N and τ are
inversely related. On the other hand, as the number of individuals grows, the
rent associated with being in charge of running the coordinating institution
becomes large enough to ensure that it will emerge.
Moreover, a welfare enhancing institution may fail to arise if the gap be-
tween the payoff from non cooperation and cooperation is not very large,
that is, if what we called trust in the state of nature is high enough. Because
the outside option is not that bad, agents are more reluctant to engage in
the costly process of institution creation. This intuitive negative correlation
between the likelihood of the emergence of formal institutions and the level
of trust sheds light on one of the fundamental identification problems that
arise in the empirical literature on social capital (see Durlauf and Fafchamps,
2006). Indeed, it seems to be the case that when formal institutions are
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weak, social capital (understood for example as trust in our model) substi-
tutes for them. When formal institutions grow stronger, a process that often
occurs along the path of development, some form of social capital may be
destroyed or become less important (see Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003,
for theoretical examples of such effects). We may therefore observe a nega-
tive correlation between measures of trust and social or economic outcomes,
but rather than reflecting some causal link, it is the result of a fundamental
endogenous link between social capital and more formal institutional forms,
of the type uncovered in our model.
Second, our model makes a step towards understanding the observed het-
erogeneity of institutions. Indeed, even when the institution emerges, it may
do so at various levels of efficiency, and in particular it may be suboptimal,
in the sense that it will charge a fee that is above the welfare maximizing
level. This is due to the absence of a collective commitment device to set
the institutional fee in advance, which allows the chosen center to adopt a
revenue maximizing strategy.
However, contrary to the previous one, this type of inefficiency is more
likely to happen for low levels of trust, i.e. when the gap between non coop-
erative and cooperative payoffs is large. So different societies face different
potential problems. When trust is low, a welfare enhancing institution is
likely to arise but will probably be too extractive in nature. In a sense, this
is the price to pay for coordination to be enforced in a context in which the
loss from non-cooperation is large. On the other hand, when trust is high,
an institution may not arise, but if it does, it is more likely to be efficient.
Indeed, because the gains from formal coordination are relatively low in that
case, an institution that would be too extractive is unlikely to be individually
incentive compatible in the first place.
We then show that the two types of inefficiencies stem from the lack
of individual and collective commitment. However, there is a fundamental
asymmetry here, in the sense that individual commitment to run the institu-
tion would not change the results above unless it is accompanied by collective
commitment on the fee that will be charged ex post. On the other hand, col-
lective commitment goes some way towards solving excessive rent extraction,
and if accompanied by individual commitment, it does restore the first best.
The question of course is how commitment may arise endogenously in a
world in which no coordination device or authority exist ex-ante. We show
that the threat of secession by subgroups of agents may generate such col-
lective commitment, at least when the level of trust is low enough and the
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number of agents not too large. On the other hand, as this number becomes
large enough, secession becomes unavoidable, resulting in a multi-institution
world. In the basic version of our model, this always reduces welfare com-
pared to a unique central institution. However, we indicate that transaction
cost considerations may introduce a trade-off here, if for example coordina-
tion in smaller groups is characterized by lower such costs. Endogenizing
these transaction costs is an interesting area for future research and would
make it possible to better understand situations characterized by multiple
institutional spheres.
Some further remarks regarding our assumptions are in order. One pos-
sible modification of our model is to relax the anonymity of the matching
technology. If formal agents could verify the identity of their partner right
after being matched nothing would change since the payoff from interacting
with an informal agent is by assumption always greater then the autarchic
payoff, so it never pays off to walk away. On the other hand, one could
assume that formal agents have a higher probability of matching with other
formal agents than the one implied by anonymous random matching process.
That would increase the value of formality and hence the fee that the center
can charge. However, outside the non-generic case in which formal agents are
matched to each other with probability one, the configuration of equilibria
would not change.
A repeated version of the game in which the central agent, once chosen,
acts as such from then on would not improve upon the one-shot version.
In this context, agents’ trigger strategies would be identical to the threshold
strategies we have already discussed in Section 5. Moreover, the central agent
could charge fees above a(N) by threatening not to perform his task. Things
would be different though if the central agent could be replaced. In this case,
the parameter set in which an efficient institution arises is likely to expand.
This is an open question that we leave for further research.
Finally, we have assumed identical agents because we were interested in
other, mainly environmental, factors that may hinder or foster the emergence
of institutions. It is clear, however, that individual heterogeneity represents
an interesting avenue for further research and in the future we intend to
explore the impact of endowment inequality on the results of the present
paper. This may have interesting implications, in particular in the field of
development economics.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since a(K) is increasing in K, only corner
configurations can prevail, i.e. no intermediate number of formal agents
0 < K < N can be supported as an equilibrium of this stage game. Suppose
that a ≤ a(K) so no formal agents wants to deviate. Then, since we also have
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a < a(K + 1), informal agents would deviate and become formal, leading to
full formality. Similarly, if a ≥ a(K + 1), which is the necessary condition
to sustain N −K informal agents, formal agents would have an incentive to
defect to informality, leading to an equilibrium with only informal agents.
Proof of Proposition 3. The condition (7) comes from just comparing
the welfare under full formality with expression (6). Taking the derivative of
the right hand side with respect to N yields
∂x(N,ω, τ)
∂N
=
1
(N + 1)2
Ã¡
ω − aF
¢
x(aF ) + aF − c
τω
− 1
τ
!
,
where we make use of the fact that, regardless of whether the solution is
interior or not, aF does not depend on N . It can be shown that ∂x(N,ω,τ)∂N > 0.
Similarly,
∂x(N,ω, τ)
∂ω
=
N
N + 1
aF (x(aF )− 1) + c
τω2
+
N
N + 1
1
τω
∂aF
∂ω
(−x(aF ) +
¡
ω − aF
¢
xa(a
F ) + 1).
Note first that the expression in brackets in the second term is the FOC
of the planner’s problem and hence it is nonnegative. Second, if aF = a(N),
∂aF
∂ω = 1 − τ > 0 and then it is clear that the lower bound x(N,ω, τ) is
increasing in ω. On the other hand, when aF = a∗ the bracketed term is
equal to zero since the FOC of the planner’s problem is binding.
Finally,
∂x(N,ω, τ)
∂τ
=
1
N + 1
(− 1
τ 2
−N
¡
ω − aF
¢
x(aF ) + aF − c
τ 2ω
+
N
N + 1
1
τω
∂aF
∂τ
(−x(aF ) +
¡
ω − aF
¢
xa(a
F ) + 1).
Again, when aF = a(N) then ∂a
F
∂τ = −ω > 0 and x(N,ω, τ) is decreasing
in τ , and when aF = a∗ the second term is equal to zero.
Proof of Corollary 1. The comparative statics on N can be derived by
noting that WF (a(N)) is increasing in N , while the upper and lower limits
do not depend on N (since a(N) = ω(1 − τ)). Rewriting WF (a(N)) =
34
N
N+1
[a(N)− c) + (ω − a(N)) x(a(N))] + ω
N+1
, the derivative with respect to
N is given by
∂WF (a(N))
∂N
=
ω (τx (a (N))− τ)− c
(N + 1)2
,
which is positive since by assumption ω(1− τ) > c and τx (a (N)) > 1.
On the other hand, the effects of the level of status-quo trust τ can be
estimated in the following way. Differentiating
WF (a(N)) =
N
N + 1
[ω − c+ τω [x(ω(1− τ))− 1]] + ω
N + 1
,
with respect to τ , we get that
∂WF (a(N))
∂τ
=
N
N + 1
ω [x (ω(1− τ))− 1− τωx0 (ω(1− τ))] ,
while the derivative of the upper bound is given by:
∂ [ωτx(a(N))]
∂τ
= ω [x (ω(1− τ))− τωx0 (ω(1− τ))] .
Since ∂[ωτx(a(N))]∂τ >
∂WF (a(N))
∂τ , and W
F (a(N)) > ωτx(a(N)) for τ close to
0 (the right hand side then tends to 0), we deduce that there is a threshold
value α such that formality is only implemented through the decentralized
procedure if τ < α. Note that depending on the value of the parameters, it
might be the case that α > 1, so no inefficiency arises.
Proof of Proposition 8. When a(N) > a∗∗, expression (17) implicitly
defines a threshold on the population size, denoted by N0(τ ,ω) such that a∗∗
is secession-proof whenever N ≤ N0(τ ,ω). Similarly, when a(N) < a∗∗ the
threshold
N1(τ ,ω) ≡
τωx(a(N))− ω
a(N)− c + 1,
can be defined as the maximum population size that is compatible with a(N)
being secession-proof. Hence, denote by
eN(τ ,ω) ≤ ½ N0(τ ,ω) if τ ≤ τ ∗∗
N1(τ ,ω) otherwise
.
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Now recall from our discussion in Section 3 that there exists a value of
the status quo trust denoted by τ ∗∗ such that a∗∗ ≥ a(N) whenever τ ≥ τ ∗∗.
In that case, min{a∗∗, a(N)} = a∗∗ and the threshold N0(τ ,ω) applies. By
the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂N0(τ ,ω)
∂τ
= N(N − 1)ω1− x(a(N)) + τωxa(a(N))
τ(ωx(a(N))− ω − c) .
Note that the denominator is the FOC of the utilitarian planner problem.
We know that when τ < τ ∗ then a(N) < a∗, and the numerator is negative
(positive otherwise).
Similarly, for τ > τ ∗∗, N1(τ ,ω) becomes the relevant threshold and
∂N1(τ ,ω)
∂τ
= ω
x(a(N))(ω − c)− τωxa(a(N))(a(N)− c)− ω
(a(N)− c)2 .
Since in this case, a(N) < a∗∗, then x(a(N)) > τωxa(a(N)) so the de-
nominator has a positive sign. Note as well, that this derivative evaluated
at τ = 0 is positive, and that the denominator is decreasing in τ . Hence,
N1(τ ,ω) is everywhere increasing in τ .
Proof of Proposition 9. When C is secession-proof the total sum of
payoffs is simply
WFC =
KX
k=1
[(Sk − 1)(a(N)− c) + ω + (Sk − 1)τωx(a(N))]
= (N + 1−K)(a(N)− c+ τωx(a(N))) +Kω.
This expression is clearly decreasing in K, the number of coalitions in
C. Therefore, the total sum of payoffs under any secession-proof coalition
structure can never be greater than under the single institution (they are
equal if the single institution is secession-proof itself).
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